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We introduce new treatments of a voluntary contribution mechanism with opportunities 
to punish, to see how contributions and punishments change when (a) each dollar lost in 
punishment must be awarded to another team member and/or when (b) obtaining 
information on individuals’ contributions is a costly choice.  Conjectures that tying 
punishments to rewards might reduce punishment of high contributors (perverse 
punishment) or increase overall punishing are not completely born out, but innovation (a) 
nonetheless succeeds in making the net punishment of high contributors much less 
common because they receive enough rewards to offset punishment.  A surprise finding 
is that innovation (b) also decreases the incidence of misdirected punishment, since high 
contributors do more monitoring than low ones while low contributors do most of the 
perverse punishing.  Both innovations raise both contributions and earnings relative to the 
familiar VCM-with-punishment treatment. 
 
Keywords  Public goods, collective action, experiment, punishment 
 




   2
Getting Punishment Right: Do Costly  
Monitoring or Redistributive Punishment Help?
* 
 
Talbot Page, Louis Putterman and Bruno Garcia 
Brown University 
 
1. Introduction: Voluntary Contributions and Punishment 
  One of the most active areas of experimental economics research in recent years 
has been the exploration of subjects’ propensities to engage in costly punishment, and the 
impact of punishment on a variety of interactions, including public goods dilemmas.  
Punishment is of interest both for the practical reason that it may play a pivotal role in 
solving these and other dilemma problems by creating self-interested incentives to 
contribute (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach, 2006), and 
because its robust manifestation is a strong indication of a social preference or 
psychological predisposition that has broad implications for both theory and policy 
(Field, 2001; Fehr and Schmidt, 2003).   
  Although the demand for punishment and its usually pronounced effect on 
voluntary contributions are remarkable, authors including Cinyabuguma, Page and 
Putterman (2004), Botelho, Harrison, Costa-Pinto and Rutström (2005), and Gächter and 
Herrmann (2005) have pointed out that allowing punishment in public goods experiments 
can have a far less salutary effect on earnings, hence efficiency.  Cinyabuguma, Page and 
Putterman (2006), Ertan, Page and Putterman (2006), and Gächter, Herrmann and Thöni 
(2005) provide evidence that a major reason for the sometimes inefficient impact of 
decentralized punishment is that a substantial fraction of it is misdirected at high 
contributors—a phenomenon we call “perverse punishment.”
1   
                                                 
* We are grateful to the Department of Economics at Brown University for funding most of the experiments 
reported here; one earlier-conducted treatment used funds provided by the MacArthur Foundation network 
on norms and preferences and National Science Foundation Grant SES-0001769.  We are grateful to Omar 
Ahmed for modifying the programs used to conduct the experiments.  Garcia’s work was funded by the 
Chase Manhattan research assistantship.  
1 We call punishment of high contributors “perverse” because the expectation of it tends to discourage 
contributions, thus reducing social efficiency.  Gächter et al. use the term “anti-social punishment,” with a 
small difference in application: whereas we use it to refer to punishment received by the contributor of 
more than a group’s average amount (and sometimes in a stronger sense, the contributor of the maximum 
observed amount in the group), they use it for any instance in which a subject i punishes a subject j who has 
contributed more than i has.     3
  Recent papers have studied what happens when the cost of punishing varies 
(Anderson and Putterman, 2006, Carpenter, 2007, Nikiforakis and Norman, 2005), when 
subjects can determine for themselves whether punishment is permitted (Botelho et al. 
2005, Ertan, Page and Putterman, 2006, Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rockenbach, 2005, 2006, 
Sutter, Haigner and Kocher, 2005), and when punishers themselves can be punished 
(Nikiforakis, 2005, Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman, 2006).  The efficacy of 
punishment has also been contrasted with the efficacy of rewards, which have been found 
to be less effective and less sustained in their impact (Sefton, Shupp and Walker, 2002, 
Sutter, Haigner and Kocher, 2005), yet less objectionable to some subjects (Sutter et al.).   
  One problem that has not received much attention is that of how observable 
actions are and of what would happen if observing them entails costs that self-interested 
agents would not be expected to pay.  If a group is to engage in collective action with the 
help of punishment of free riders by other group members, what is needed is often both 
mutual monitoring and punishment or peer pressure.  Like costly punishment, costly 
monitoring can be viewed as a second-order public good that can help to solve the first- 
order public goods problem by making it incentive-compatible to contribute, but that is 
itself subject to free riding.
2  
  Another issue that remains largely unaddressed is the effect of pairing punishment 
and reward by making punishments “redistributive.”  Transferring rather than throwing 
away punished funds is more efficient in its immediate effects, but we wondered about its 
incentive effects.  An experiment that likewise reduces the efficiency cost of punishment 
is Casari and Plott (2003), in which earnings lost to the person targeted for punishment 
are transferred to the punisher, so that there is self-interest in punishing.  In Sausgruber 
and Tyran (2007), funds deducted by punishment are distributed to another team member, 
but punishment is costless to the punisher.  
  In this paper, we study a set of experimental treatments that permit us to study 
both costly monitoring and redistributive punishment.  In two treatments, subjects learn 
the contributions of the individual members of their group only if they pay for the 
information, which then entitles them to impose a certain amount of punishment (or 
                                                 
2 Grosse, Putterman and Rockenbach (2007) study team members’ decisions to invest in costly monitoring 
when the impact of such investments is to eliminate free riding incentives by making team production 
incentive-compatible, as envisaged by Alchian and Demsetz (1972).     4
punishment and rewards) should they wish to.  In two treatments, the earnings a punisher 
deducts from a targeted team member must be assigned by the punisher to some other 
member of the team, which renders punishment redistributive in nature and makes each 
dollar of punishment also a dollar of reward.   
  The inclusion of costly information treatments allow us to compare willingness to 
incur costs to punish with willingness to incur costs for information on which punishment 
might be based.  It seemed to us that punishment could be either more common or less 
common when there is a monitoring cost: more common because curiosity might spur 
payments for information after which subjects punish (in our treatments this entails no 
additional cost); less common because not having the information displayed might mean 
that instead of feeling anger at free riders subjects might simply accept the “inevitability” 
of low contributions and choose not to “throw good money after bad.”   
  We find, surprisingly, that making contribution information costly doesn’t 
significantly alter the overall frequency of punishing, but that it does reduce the 
proportion of punishment perversely aimed at high contributors.  The reason is that it is 
the higher contributors who disproportionately purchase the contributions information, 
and since they rarely engage in perverse punishment, having the information be a costly 
pre-condition to punishment tends to screen out many perverse punishers. 
  The treatments in which punishment is costly to the punisher but redistributive 
among the other subjects let us study the incentive effects of such an arrangement.  We 
anticipated that these effects might include (a) providing incentives to contribute more, 
because higher contributors might be rewarded, (b) eliciting more punishment, if concern 
about aggregate efficiency discourages some punishing in the heretofore standard 
treatments, and (c) motivating “pro-social” more than “anti-social” punishers, since the 
former (those who tend to punish low contributors) might value the rewarding of high 
contributors as well as the punishing of low ones.  We find no evidence of effects (b) or 
(c), but strong evidence of effect (a). 
  In addition to incentive effects, having punishment losses be redistributed to other 
subjects has a resource effect that calls for care in its evaluation.  A basic idea in cost-
benefit analysis is that a dollar is a dollar, no matter in whose pocket it lands.  This 
dictum allows, as a matter of practicality, cost-benefit practitioners to set aside   5
distributional issues while estimating total net benefits and efficiency gains for a 
proposed policy.  This principle of traditional cost-benefit analysis allows the practitioner 
to focus, for example, on potential Pareto improvements rather than actual Pareto 
improvements.  A basic idea in the mechanism design literature, in contrast, is that 
differing distributions have differing incentive effects on efficiency, and thus differing 
distributions should not be set aside.  When it comes to evaluating our experimental 
results, our ability as experimenters to shift opportunities from, e.g., punishment that 
“burns” the losses of those targeted to punishment that preserves those dollars and gives 
them to others, puts our redistributive treatments at an efficiency advantage that is in 
some respects artificial.  It is important, therefore, to disentangle the resource and 
incentive effects of the institutional changes we induce.  
  Our experimental design permits us to do just this.  Estimating the effects of the 
alternative policies both inclusive of and exclusive of resource costs, as we will do, 
illustrates incentive and resource separability in a way that is rarely practicable in policy 
analysis.  We calculate, first, overall efficiencies, a straightforward procedure in the 
experimental setting.  Then we net out the differences in the direct resource costs from 
“throwing away” or redistributing punishment costs and from making information or 
punishment either free or costly to the punisher.  We find that having one subject’s 
earnings reductions (penalties) be distributed to others can have not only the direct 
resource benefit inherent in this mechanism but also an incentive benefit that raises 
efficiency by encouraging more contributions to the public good.  And we find that 
switching from a costly punishment to a costly information mechanism is not deleterious 
to incentive efficiency, although its small positive effect is not significant.  
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we give details of the 
experimental design.  In section 3, we discuss relevant theoretical issues and predictions.  
Section 4 describes and analyses the results of the experiment.  Section 5 provides further 




  Our starting point is the well-known design of a voluntary contributions 
mechanism with punishment, in which subjects are randomly assigned to groups that   6
remain fixed (a “partners” design) for a finite and known number of periods.  In this 
experiment there are 4 members to each group and 20 periods in an experimental session.  
In the first stage of each period each subject in a group is provided with an initial 
endowment that he or she is asked to divide between a private account and a group 
account, before observing the choices of fellow group members.  Once the choices are 
made the subjects learn the amounts others in the group contributed to the group account.  
The total amount of funds placed in the group account is scaled up by the experimenter 
and divided equally among the subjects in the group without regard to individual 
contribution.  In the second stage, each subject can reduce the earnings of others in his or 
her group.  A reduction (“punishment”) is costly to both the punished and the punisher. 
  In this baseline treatment with punishment, the payoff function for subject i for a 
period is  
 
(1) Baseline treatment P   ∑ ∑ ∑
≠ ≠ =











where subject i is endowed with 10 experimental dollars (hereafter E$) each period, and 
Ci is i’s contribution to the group account; the scaling factor is 1.6 (when divided four 
way, 0.4) and the summation is taken over the 4 members of i’s group; Pij is the amount 
of punishment i imposes on j, 0.25 is the cost of punishing per dollar of punishment; and 
Pji is the amount of punishment i receives from each other subject j.
3  General constraints 
on punishment in all treatments were: (i) a subject could not spend more than her/his pre-
punishment earnings for the period on reducing the earnings of other subjects, (ii) a 
subject’s post-punishment earnings for a period would be set to zero if earnings yi in 
equation (1) were negative, and (iii) a subject i could not spend more on reducing the 
earnings of a subject j in any period than would single-handedly reduce j’s earnings 
according in (1) to less than zero.
4 
                                                 
3 Experimental dollars converted to U.S. dollars at the rate of one experimental dollar = $0.07 at the end of 
the session.  In the rest of our discussion, the word “dollar” should be understood to mean experimental 
dollar.  Subject earnings over twenty periods plus a $5 show-up fee averaged a little under $25 in U.S. 
currency. 
4 The payment functions and restrictions are identical to those in Bochet et al. (2006) and Page et al. 
(2005).  The purpose of (i) and (ii) was to keep all decisions financially independent of each other while 
maintaining a guaranteed minimum payment for recruiting reasons.  The purpose of (iii) was to help 
subjects to avoid pointless spending on punishment in view of constraint (ii).  Note, however, that it   7
This design generates the familiar result (for self-interested subjects) that it is 
socially optimal for each subject to contribute everything to the group account without 
any punishment, but privately optimal to contribute nothing and not punish.  In replicated 
experiments, however, subjects make some contributions and impose some punishment.  
Experimentalists have found that the opportunity to punish creates an incentive to 
increase contributions but often has little effect on efficiency, partly because punishment 
is costly to both punisher and the punished, and partly because some punishment is 
directed at high contributors, thus tending to undermine the incentive to contribute.
5   
To further study incentive and resource effects on punishment, contributions, and 
efficiency we consider three other treatments in comparison with our baseline treatment.  
Our first comparison treatment is redistributive punishment (RP).  In this treatment each 
dollar of punishment i imposes on another group member i must redistribute to one or 
both of the remaining two members of the group (in other words reductions in earnings 
act like fines to be redistributed rather than behaving like physical punishments to be 
endured).  As in the baseline treatment it still costs (E$0.25) to reduce another’s earnings 
by E$1.  Subject i’s payoff function is:   
 
(2) RP  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
≠ ≠ ≠ =













where Rki is the number of dollars that others have redistributed to i.  At the end of the 
punishment/reward stage, subject i is shown the net change in her earnings due to 




ji ki P R , but not its addition and reduction 
                                                                                                                                                 
remained possible for subjects to “overspend” on punishing in the sense that both subject i and, say, subject 
k might each spend enough to reduce j’s earnings for the period to zero, although only one subject’s 
punishment would actually be effective in that case, given (ii).  This could happen because subjects did not 
learn of punishment not carried out by or aimed at them, and the design (as in Fehr and Gächter, 2000a) 
keeps such information private so as not to encourage free riding on punishment. 
5 Thus, Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman (2004) and Botelho et al. (2006) report earnings to be lower in 
treatments with than in those without punishment, although Nikiforakis and Norman (2005) find that 
whether this is so is sensitive to parameter choice and some experiments, such as Gürerk et al. (2006), find 
earnings higher in groups with punishment.  Ertan, Page and Putterman (2006) find earnings lower with 
than without punishment in groups in which who can be punished is unrestricted, but higher with than 
without punishment in groups that have voted to permit only low contributors to be punished.   8
components separately.  The Appendix shows the screen design for entering an 
individual’s contribution, punishment and reward decisions. 
  The second comparison treatment is like the baseline treatment (1), except that in 
each period information on others’ contributions is costly, while imposing punishment is 
free up to a limit, if the subject has paid for the information.  The cost of information is 
E$1 for a period, and the limit on a subject’s punishing for that period is E$10.  The 
payoff function for subject i for a period for this treatment with punishment and costly 
information (CIP) is  
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where Ii = E$1 if i pays for information in the period in question, 0 otherwise; and if i 
pays for information i can impose any amount of punishment from E$0 up to the limit of 
E$10 in total on other group members.  
  The third comparison treatment is like the redistributive punishment treatment (2) 
in that money “punished away” from one subject must be assigned to another, and like 
the costly information treatment (3) in that in each period information on others’ 
contributions is costly, while imposing punishment is free up to a limit, if the subject has 
paid for the information. The payoff function for subject i for a period for this treatment 
with free redistributive punishment with costly information (CIRP) is 
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Thus, in treatments P and RP group members learned one another’s contributions 
immediately and could punish or punish and redistribute within limits for 25 
experimental cents to the experimental dollar, while in treatments CIP and CIRP group 
members chose whether to spend one experimental dollar after the contribution decisions 
of each period to be informed of one another’s individual contributions, and could then 
punish or punish and redistribute up to a total of E$10.     9
  The payoff functions for the four treatments can be summarized by a single 
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and punishment CIP 
Costly information 
& redistributive 
punishment CIRP  
 α 1 = 0.25 
 α 2 = 0 
 α 3 = 0 
 α 1 = 0.25 
 α 2 = 1 
 α 3 = 0 
 α 1 = 0 
 α 2 = 0 
 α 3 = 1 
 α 1 = 0 
 α 2 = 1 
 α 3 = 1 
Table 1. Differences in the payoff for the four treatments, as summarized by 
parameters α1, α2, α3.  
 
where with the different parameter values there will be differing resource and incentive 
effects.
6  By netting out the resource effects we identify incentive effects on efficiency.  
Table 2 summarizes the natures of the four treatments in a 2 X 2 schema and shows 
subject, session, and group counts.   
 
3. Questions and Predictions 
  The underlying finitely repeated VCM or public goods game at the heart of our 
treatments has been conducted many times with similar results.  Theoretically, the 
dominant strategy for a payoff maximizing individual interacting with other payoff 
maximizing individuals is to contribute nothing to the group account, thus earning E$10 
each period.  In the lab, however, contributions typically begin at an average of 50% or 
more of endowments and decline with repetition.  Explanations that have been offered 
include confusion and learning, altruism, “warm glow,” reciprocity, as well as 
combinations of such factors and heterogeneity of preferences among individuals. 
 
 
                                                 
6  The fact that values of Rki and/or of Ii are not explicitly elicited from subjects in all treatments can be 
ignored since α2 and/or α3 = 0 when that is the case.   10
Costs to the punisher/monitor   






Cost to punish, not to monitor 
(α1 = 0.25,  α3 = 0) 
 
No redistributive punishment 
(α2 = 0) 
 




Cost to monitor, not to punish 
(α1 = 0,  α3 = 1) 
 
No redistributive punishment 
(α2 = 0) 
 


































Cost to punish, not to monitor 
(α1 = 0.25,  α3 = 0) 
 
Redistributive punishment 
(α2 = 1) 
 




Cost to monitor, not to punish 
(α1 = 0,  α3 = 1) 
 
Redistributive punishment 
(α2 = 1) 
 
4 sessions, 16 groups, 
64 subjects 
Table 2.  2 x 2 Schema of Treatments with Session and Subject Information 
 
 Treatment  P resembles the original VCM-with-punishment treatment in Fehr and 
Gächter (2000), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2002), Carpenter and Matthews (2002), and 
other experiments, and corresponds exactly to the “punishment only” treatment in Page, 
Putterman and Unel (2005).
7  The opportunity to impose costly punishment should not be 
made use of by payoff maximizers knowing they are playing with others of the same 
type, but many subjects are observed to punish, even in the known last period.  Most 
punishment is aimed at lower contributors, but a minority of punishment is directed at 
high contributors.  The existence of a punishment opportunity typically increases 
contributions at the outset, implying that some subjects anticipate that they will be 
punished if they contribute too little.  Contributions then either rise, remain roughly the 
                                                 
7 Differences from Fehr and Gächter (2000) are relatively minor and include use of a constant rather than 
increasing punishment cost, endowment of 10 rather than 20, lack of a within-subject comparison condition 
without punishment, and use of the partner matching protocol only.   11
same, or decline more slowly and significantly less overall than in treatments without 
punishment.
8 
  Having each unit of punishment be balanced by a unit of reward in treatment RP 
may affect the amount of punishment and who it is directed at in at least two different 
ways.  First, if subjects care about total earnings, as proposed by Charness and Rabin 
(2002), then they will be less reluctant to punish in the RP and CIRP than in the P and 
CIP treatments, so the former treatments would see more punishing overall.  Second, any 
punishment that in ordinary punishment treatments is motivated by the desire to increase 
the punisher’s earnings relative to the average earnings of others in the group should no 
longer be undertaken, which would tend to reduce the amount of punishment purchased.  
While the impact on total punishment is thus unclear, the impact on the proportion of 
punishment given to high contributors appears likely to be negative.
9  As for the effect on 
contributions, they can be expected to be higher, both because there’s likely to be less 
perverse punishment and (perhaps) more punishment overall, and  because of the extra 
incentive provided by rewards going to high contributors.   Notice that a high contributor 
who is punished (perversely) by one group member but rewarded by others to a greater 
degree receives no signal of perverse punishment, so any perverse punishing that takes 
place may be undetectable by its targets. 
The effect of making information costly is difficult to predict.  Like punishment 
itself, the information should never be requested by payoff maximizing subjects who 
assume that others are also payoff maximizing.  The fact that many subjects do typically 
punish suggests that many might also request the information as a first step toward 
punishing.  However, if punishment is an emotional response to evidence of free riding, it 
seems possible that the absence of the immediate stimulus of information about free 
riding might cool the anger that can motivate punishing, leading to less punishment.  We 
made up to ten units of punishment costless in the costly information treatments, once the 
                                                 
8 Nikiforakis and Normann (forthcoming) find the contribution trend to be systematically related to the cost 
to the punished individual per unit cost to the punisher: the higher the cost of punishment to the person 
targeted, the more sustained and increasing are contributions. 
9 Notice that a subject who cares about inequalities relative to individuals rather than the group as a whole, 
disliking inequalities that are disadvantageous to him more than he dislikes those that favor him (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999), may be motivated to punish high earners and give to low earners.  But the efficiency-
reducing act of punishing indiscriminately to bring all others’ earnings down is frustrated by the 
requirement to redistribute.     12
information cost had been paid, in order to focus on the costly information decision and 
not on both costly information and additionally costly punishment.  (Ours is the first 
VCM treatments with costly information, to our knowledge.)  Insofar as we compare the 
amount of punishment given in the costly information treatments to that given in the free 
information treatments, we keep in mind that the average cost of punishment is much 
lower in the costly information treatments.  Thus, if reluctance to pay for information 
were not a factor, punishment might be expected to be more common in the costly 
information treatments, since it costs less to the punisher (compare Carpenter, 2007, and 
Anderson and Putterman, 2006). 
 
4. Experiment and Results 
  As Table 2 shows, we conducted four sessions of each treatment, in each of which 
sixteen inexperienced subjects drawn from the general undergraduate student body (about 
5700 students) at Brown University were randomly assigned to groups of four.  Thus, 64 
subjects per treatment and 256 subjects in all took part. Subjects, recruited by flyer or job 
posting in an on-line campus magazine, sat at desks in a computer classroom, read the 
instructions on-screen as the experimenter read aloud, answered practice questions on 
paper and using a practice version of the experiment’s computer interface, had their 
procedural questions if any answered, then made their series of binding decisions, 
without communication.  P treatment sessions were conducted in 2000 and 2001; those of 
the CIRP treatment in the fall of 2003; and those of the CIP and RP treatments in late 
winter and early spring of 2006.
10  Instructions for all treatments are available on request. 
 
Contributions 
  Figure 1a shows average contribution by period in the P and RP treatments, while 
Figure 1b shows average contribution by period in the CIP and CIRP treatments, and the 
first row of Table 3 indicates contributions in each treatment averaged over all 20 
periods.  Considering the treatments paired in the figures, we find average contributions 
                                                 
10 The P treatment data are those referred to as the “punishment only” treatment in Page, Putterman and 
Unel (2005), while the RP, CIP and CIRP treatments are new to this paper.  Instructions, screen lay-outs, 
and experimental protocols were uniform across the four treatments except as required by specific design 
elements.   13
higher in both cases when punishment is redistributive, that is higher in RP than in P and 
higher in CIRP than in CIP.
11   But the stronger contribution performance of the CIP 
than of the P treatment makes for a smaller contributions gap between CIRP and CIP 
(Fig. 1b).  In other words, all three of our experiment’s innovations (costly monitoring, 
redistributive punishment, and their combination) boost contributions relative to the now-
familiar P treatment.  The differences vary in significance, however.  Mann-Whitney U 
tests, treating the contribution in each group of 4 subjects averaged over the 20 periods as 
an observation, find that contributions are higher in RP than in P, significant at the 5% 
level in a two-tailed test, that those in CIRP exceed those in P at the 10% level in a one-
tailed test only, and that contributions don’t differ significantly among any other pair 
among the four treatments, including the comparison between CIP and CIRP.
12  A 
preliminary conclusion is that the treatments with redistributive punishment especially 
are quite successful at raising contributions.  Two potential explanations—(1) that there 
are added incentives to contribute more due to rewards, and (2) that there is less perverse 
punishment of high contributors—will be explored later.  The CIP treatment also raises 
contributions, albeit insignificantly, allaying fears that subjects might not engage in 
monitoring. 
 
Result 1.  Both making punishment redistributive and making monitoring rather than 
punishment costly lead to higher contributions to the public good, with the difference 
attributable to the first factor being statistically significant. 
 
                                                 
11 We graph the treatments in pairs to increase visibility, pairing the treatments on the left side of Table 2 
and those on the right side of that table because, being distinguished by the value of  α2 only (versus 
differentiation of both α1 and  α3 for left/right comparisons in the table), the members of these pairings are 
more readily comparable.   
12 The difference in contributions between the CIRP and the P treatment is significant at the 11% level in a 
two-tailed test, hence at close to the 5.5% level in a one-tailed test.  The difference between the CIP and 
the CIRP treatments is insignificant, because despite the averaged trends shown in Figure 1b, several 
groups in the CIP treatment achieved higher average contributions than several groups in the CIRP 
treatment.   14
 
































Table 3.  Average contributions and earnings, by treatment.  The definition of 
adjusted earnings is given in the text. 
 
Earnings 
Figure 2a shows average earnings by period in the P and RP treatments, while 
Figure 2b shows average earnings by period in the CIP and CIRP treatments, and the 
second row of Table 3 indicates earnings in each treatment averaged over all 20 periods.  
Not surprisingly, earnings in the treatments with redistributive punishment exceed those 
in the treatments with only reductions, and this is true in every period.  In this case, 
Mann-Whitney tests show earnings to be higher in RP than in P and higher in CIRP than 
in CIP, in both cases significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.  Earnings are also 
significantly higher in the RP treatment than in the CIP treatment and in the CIRP 
treatment than in the P treatment (in other words, earnings are higher in each treatment 
with redistributive punishment than in each treatment with only reductions).  Earnings in 
the two treatments with only reductions (CIP and P) and those in the two treatments with 
redistributive punishment (RP and CIRP) do not significantly differ from each other.  
We cannot be too impressed, however, by the superiority of the RP over the P 
and the CIRP over the CIP treatment in terms of total earnings, since such an outcome 
was to some extent engineered by us through having the punished funds be “burned” in 
the first of each pair of treatments but remain in the group (and simply change hands) in 
the second.  We want to check, then, whether there is any efficiency difference if we 
control for these obvious resource differences.  Similarly, we should check whether 
differences between the CIRP and CIP treatments, on the one hand, and the RP and P   15
treatments, on the other, are due to the fact that the cost of information in the former is 
low compared to the potential cost of punishing in the latter.
13   
We accomplish both ends by adjusting earnings in the RP, CIP and CIRP 
treatments to put them on a “resource equivalent” footing with respect to each other and 
to the P treatment.  Two adjustments are made in this exercise.  First, the redistributive 
and the ordinary (non-redistributive) punishment treatments are put on equal footings by 
not counting earnings from transfers (rewards) when calculating adjusted earnings in the 
RP and CIRP treatments.  Second, the costly monitoring treatments are put on the same 
footing as the costly punishment treatments by subtracting the monitoring costs and 
adding an E$0.25 cost to the punisher for each dollar of punishment imposed.  The 
results, shown in the third row of Table 3, are lower adjusted than actual earnings in the 
RP, CIP and CIRP treatments, with the change largest in RP and CIRP.  Even so, 
average adjusted earnings are higher in treatments with redistributive punishment or 
costly monitoring, but the earnings advantage over the P treatment looks large only in 
RP.  Mann-Whitney tests confirm that this is the case: RP adjusted earnings are higher 
than those in each of the other treatments, significant at just short of the 5% level in 1-
tailed tests, while no other adjusted earnings differences are significant.  Thus, having 
punishments be redistributed has an incentive as well as a resource effect on efficiency in 
one pair of treatments (RP vs. P) but not in the other (CIRP vs. CIP).  There is a small 
efficiency gain from making monitoring rather than punishing costly, but it is not 
consistent enough across groups to be significant in non-parametric tests, once the 
resource effect is controlled for.
14  
 
Result 2: Both making punishment redistributive and making monitoring rather than 
punishing costly lead to higher earnings, but only the first change leads to a significant 
(pure) incentive effect on earnings, and only in the costly punishment case. 
                                                 
13 Although the E$1 cost of information was sufficiently high to dissuade the average subject from 
requesting it in over 75% of periods (see below), once a subject had the information up to E$10 of 
punishment could be given at no further cost, making the effective cost to i of giving E$1 of punishment to 
j as low as E$0.10 in the CIP and CIRP treatments versus E$0.25 in the P and RP treatments. 
14 We say “consistent across groups” because the Mann-Whitney test tells us not whether 13.00 is far 
enough above 12.88, say, for the difference in averages to be significant, but whether enough groups in 
CIP treatment earn more than enough groups in P treatment for the two to be likely to come from different 
distributions, something that can hold regardless of how large or small the numerical differences are.    16
 
Punishing and Rewarding Frequencies and Amounts 
The sustained high contributions observed in all treatments suggests that many 
subjects anticipated receiving or actually received punishment when not contributing or 
when contributing little to their group account.
15  How often did punishment actually 
occur?  In the P, RP, CIP and CIRP treatments a subject punished at least one other 
subject in his/her group in an average 28.8%, 23.9%, 19.1% and 23.2% of periods, 
respectively, and a subject was punished by one or more other subjects on average in 
30.2%, 20.6%, 20.3% and 25.0% of periods, respectively.  78.1%, 76.6%, 81.3% and 
82.8% of subjects punished at least one other subject at least once during their 
experiment session, and 81.3%, 71.9%, 90.6% and 96.9% were punished at least once.
16  
The average number of dollars by which a subject i reduced the earnings of a subject j in 
a single instance of punishment was E$2.59, E$3.18, E$6.11 and E$5.06 in the respective 
treatments.  Because j was often punished by more than one individual at a time, for 
instance during a period in which j’s contribution was much lower than the group’s 
average, and because in the RP and CIRP treatments a subject j might receive both 
reward and punishment (from different team members) in the same period, the total 
number of dollars by which j’s earnings were reduced in a typical instance of being 
punished differs from the typical amount of punishment given by any one subject; the 
average (net) punishment received is E$3.69, E$5.10, E$8.39 and E$6.39, respectively.  
In the RP and CIRP treatments, each dollar taken from an individual j was given to 
another individual, k.  On average, subjects had their earnings added to (on balance) in 
25.2% of periods in RP and in 26.3% of periods in CIRP, with the total (net) amount 
added in a given instance (summing together multiple transfers and subtracting off any 
punishments, when applicable) being E$3.49 in RP and E$5.33 in CIRP.  
                                                 
15 Note that fear of punishment can have not only the direct effect of dissuading those inclined to free-ride 
from doing so, but also the indirect effect of inducing conditional cooperators to contribute more (or to not 
reduce their contributions), since the direct effect leads to greater expected contributions by others. 
16 Recalling that a subject in RP or CIRP treatment could be targeted for punishment by one or even two 
group members, yet receive no indication of having been punished because others rewarded them still more 
in the same period, we recalculated the relevant percentages for those treatments to reflect the proportion 
who received net punishment, of which they could be aware, on at least one occasion.  The figure for RP 
falls slightly from 71.9% to 70.3%, but the figure for the CIRP treatment turns out to be unaffected.   17
We ask two questions about the effects of treatment on the total amount of 
punishing: 
1. Did subjects do more punishing when punishment was redistributive and was 
accordingly less directly costly to efficiency, as would be predicted by theories in which 
agents value aggregate earnings (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002)? 
  The answer is: No.  Total dollars of punishment given are no different in the RP 
treatment than in the P treatment, and no different in the CIRP treatment than in the CIP 
treatment, according to Mann-Whitney tests.  In the context of our public goods game, 
where subjects’ attentions seem to be focused on how much to contribute, who is free 
riding, and who to punish, aggregate earnings don’t seem to influence the punishment 
decision. 
 
Result 3a.  Punishers punish no less when the social cost of punishing is higher (i.e. 
the money taken is “burned”). 
 
2. Did subjects do more punishing when the average and marginal cost of punishing is 
lower? 
  The answer is: Yes.  Although the total number of times that a subject punishes 
another subject is not significantly different among the treatments, the total number of 
dollars by which subjects are punished is significantly greater in the CIP and CIRP 
treatments (where one can give up to 10 dollars of punishment with no additional charge 
after paying E$1 for contribution information) than in the P and RP treatments (in which 
each punishment dollar costs the punisher E$0.25).
17  The finding that more punishment 
is given when it is less expensive is consistent with Anderson and Putterman (2005), 
Carpenter (2007), and Nikiforakis and Normann (forthcoming). 
 
Result 3b.  Punishers punish less when the private cost of punishing is higher. 
 
                                                 
17 According to Mann-Whitney tests, total dollars of reductions by punishment are greater in CIP than in P, 
although significant only at the 10% level and only in a one-tailed test.  Dollars of punishment in CIRP are 
greater than those in RP significant at the 10% level in a two-tailed test and at the 5% level in a one-tailed 
test.  Punishment dollars in CIRP also exceed those in P at the 10% level in a one-tailed test, and those in 
CIP exceed those in RP at the 10% level in a two-tailed test and at the 5% level in a one-tailed test.     18
Monitoring 
To our knowledge, the CIP and CIRP treatments are the first in the VCM 
literature to introduce costly monitoring as a distinct choice.  We find that subjects paid 
for information about others’ contributions (and for the right to punish or redistribute 
earnings) in an average of 20.7% of periods in the CIP treatment and 24.1% of periods in 
the CIRP treatment.  The total number of requests for information does not significantly 
differ between these two treatments in a Mann-Whitney test using group-level 
observations.  A subject proceeded to punish at least one other subject or to punish and 
reward at least one pair of subjects 89.0% of the times that he or she purchased the 
contribution information in the CIP treatment and 94.5% of such times in the CIRP 
treatment.  Comparing treatments in which monitoring was costly to their counterpart 
treatments in which it was not, there are no significant differences among the treatments 
in the number of events in which some i punished some j.  This suggests that having to 
pay for information is not in itself a deterrent to engaging in punishment. 
 
Result 4.  Making monitoring rather than punishing costly leads to no change in 
frequency of punishment.   
 
Who was Punished and Rewarded? 
Following Fehr and Gächter (2000), we estimate regressions to investigate 
whether subjects were singled out for punishment as a function of having contributed less 
or more than others in their group.  Define subject i’s absolute negative and positive 
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and 
where                         is the average of others’ constributions.    
 
In the regression equations, the dependent variable is the number of dollars of 
punishment received by subject i in period t, and the explanatory variables are the 
Absolute Negative Deviation, Positive Deviation, the average contributed by others in i’s   19
group, and group and period fixed effects.  Note that the rewards that may also have been 
given to i in the RP and CIRP treatments are not considered here, so subjects who were 
actually net reward recipients may still have positive values of the dependent variable in 
this regression.  We estimate the regressions both by OLS and by Tobit, which accounts 
for the fact that the amount of punishment cannot be less than 0 and that there are many 
observations of 0 punishment.  All regressions include period and group fixed effects.
18  
Results are shown in Table 4.   
 
Treatment  P RP  CIP  CIRP 























































# Obs.  1280 1280 1280 1280 1280  1280  1280  1280 
F stat.  24.49  42.05  45.17    25.77   
χ
2   724.15  675.32   590.71    480.64 
Adj. R




 0.215  0.254   0.204    0.149 
Table 4.  Determinants of punishment received.  Dependent variable: E$s of 
punishment received by subject j.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  All 
regressions include group and period fixed effects, not shown.  ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  Both the OLS and the Tobit estimates for all four treatments show that absolute 
negative deviations have a highly significant positive effect on punishment.  The 
coefficient on positive deviation is positive in all of the OLS estimates but negative in all 
                                                 
18 A drawback of the Tobit model is that unconditional fixed effects estimates can be biased.  Fixed effects 
for individuals are not used because the data are organized at the level of the recipient of punishment and 
those giving the punishment could not identify the recipient as the same individual from one period to the 
next.     20
four Tobit estimates, with some statistically significant coefficients associated with both 
signs.  While some weight should also be accorded to the Tobit estimates, the positive 
coefficients in the OLS estimates are hinting at the presence of perverse punishment, on 
which we report in greater detail later on.   
To see whether punishment was mainly motivated by the hope of increasing 
others’ contributions in subsequent periods, we also estimated variants of all regressions 
shown in Table 4 adding an interaction term between a period 20 dummy variable and 
each of the first two explanatory variables.  According to the OLS results, subjects are 
punished more for each dollar of absolute negative deviation in period 20 of the P and 
CIRP treatments, and less for each dollar of absolute negative deviation in period 20 of 
the RP and CIP treatments, as compared with the other nineteen periods.  The 
corresponding Tobit estimates show no significant period 20 differences.  These results 
(which are not shown, to save space) provide little support for the idea that punishment is 
mainly motivated by strategic considerations, and are more consistent with punishment 
being a preference-based or emotional response to free riding, as suggested by Casari and 
Luini (2005) and Hopfensitz and Reuben (2007), among others. 
   
Result 5.  Punishment is aimed disproportionately at groups’ lower contributors, and is 
not lessened by the absence of a strategic motivation in the last period. 
 
Who was rewarded and what determined net reward/punishment in RP and CIRP? 
We investigate the determinants of which subjects had their earnings added to 
using a parallel specification to that of Table 4, with results shown in Table 5.  In the first 
four columns, as in Table 4, the dependent variable doesn’t account for possibly 
simultaneous punishments: it is the “gross reward,” not the “reward net of any 
countervailing punishment” that may have been given to j.  In the four right-hand 
columns, however, we show the results of similar regressions, but this time the dependent 
variable is net reward, which accounts for both reward and punishment but takes a value 
of zero for a subject who received only punishment or more punishment than reward.  It 
is this dependent variable that corresponds to reward according to j’s information set.  In 
the first four regressions, we find that rewards seem well targeted for efficiency, because   21
there is a significant positive effect of a subject’s positive deviation from others’ average 
contribution (subjects who contribute more tend to be rewarded more) and a significant 
negative effect of absolute negative deviation (subjects who contribute less are rewarded 
significantly less).  The less are others’ contributions, the less is one rewarded, ceteris 
paribus—perhaps reflecting that there was less rewarding in groups with fewer high 
contributors.  The four right-hand regressions provide an even stronger indication of 
efficient targeting.   
 
   Dep. Var. 
Ind. Var. 
Reward Received  Net Reward Received 
(Reward – Punishment) 
Treatment  RP CIRP  RP  CIRP 











-.109***   
(.027) 
-1.307***   
(.300) 
-.106**    
(.0507) 












.419***   
(.078) 
.581**    
(.287) 
.616***   
(.116) 












-.204***   
(.071) 
-.973***   
(.278) 
-.322***   
(.117) 
-1.434***   
(.377) 
# Obs.  1280 1280 1280 1280 1280  1280  1280  1280 
F stat.  16.17  11.79  15.47    8.27   
χ
2   584.08  390.35  563.59    300.41 
Adj. R








 0.1940   0.0931 
 
Table 5.  Determinants of rewards and of net rewards.  Dependent variables: left, E$s 
of additions received by subject j; right, same minus E$s of punishment received by j.  
All regressions include group and period fixed effects, not shown.  ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  As with punishment, we also checked whether the pattern and amount of rewards 
was substantially changed in the last period, by re-estimating the regressions of Table 5 
adding as an explanatory variable a period 20 dummy variable multiplied by absolute   22
negative deviation and another one multiplied by positive deviation.  The resulting 
coefficients on the positive deviation interaction terms indicate that there was a strong 
last period effect in the RP treatment, fully negating the earlier observed tendency to 
reward higher contributions, but there was no effect of the last period on rewarding 
higher contributions in the CIRP treatment.  As for the negative deviation interactions, 
the negative impact of lower contributions on rewards is significantly enhanced in period 
20 of RP but seems to disappear in period 20 of CIRP.  Differential rewards do, 
therefore, persist into the last period in both treatments, although in different ways. 
(These results are not shown to save space.)   
 
Result 6.   Rewards are given disproportionately to groups’ higher contributors, and 
the rewarding of high more than low contributors continues in the last period. 
 
When did Subjects Monitor, and Who Monitored? 
  Table 6 shows the results of two probit regressions, one for each of the treatments 
in which a subject learned individuals’ contributions only if she chose to pay E$1.  The 
dependent variable takes the value 1 if the individual paid for the information on 
contributions in the period in question and 0 otherwise.  Individual and period fixed 
effects are included but not shown.  The specification is designed to let us investigate two 
issues: (a) were a group’s higher contributors or its lower contributors more likely to 
request the information? (b) was a subject more likely to request the information when 
the total contribution of others was smaller (suggesting that there might be free riders to 
punish)?  The specification also closely parallels those of the previous two tables.  The 
results indicate that (a) in both the CIP and the CIRP treatment, the further above the 
average contribution of others in her group was a given subject’s contribution, the more 
likely was she to monitor (pay for information), as shown by the significant positive 
coefficient on positive deviation, and (b) the lower was the average contribution of 
others, the more likely was a subject to monitor, which is consistent with a desire to 
punish free riders (i.e., monitoring becomes unnecessary in groups achieving high levels 
of cooperation).   23
 
Treatment  CIP CIRP 
Abs. Neg. 
Deviation 
.088***    
(.033) 
.008 
   (.037) 
Positive 
Deviation 
.486***    
(.065) 
.530*** 
          (.088) 
Av. Oth. 
Contr. 




# Obs.  1100 1080 
χ






Table 6.  Determinants of monitoring.  Probit regressions. Dependent variable: subject 
requested contribution information.  All regressions include individual and period fixed 
effects, not shown.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Result 7.  Higher contributors monitored more than others, and there was more 
monitoring when average contributions were lower. 
 
How did punishment affect contributions? 
 
One obvious way in which inclusion of a punishment (or punishment and reward) 
stage can lead to higher contributions is by causing those targeted to change their 
behaviors.  We investigate this by estimating regressions in which subject i’s change of 
contribution from period t to period t+1 is the dependent variable, and the explanatory 
variables measure the amount of punishment given to i in period t, differentiated to 
account for how i’s contribution compared to that of others in the group in that period.  
Specifically, we interact the total (in P and CIP) or net (in RP and CIRP) punishment 
dollars received (where net punishment can be negative if i was on balance rewarded) by 
subject i in period t with dummy variables for the recipient’s contribution ranking.  We 
define dummy variable h as 1 if i’s contribution was the highest in the group in period t, 0   24
otherwise; dummy variable l as 1 if i made the lowest contribution in the group, 0 
otherwise; and similarly for dummy variables “2
nd”and “3
rd,” for second highest and for 
third highest contributor.
19  We also include the dummy variables h, 3
rd, and l as non-
interacted or “stand alone” terms, because changes in contributions could occur 
independently of receiving punishment
20 (for example, a highest contributor might tend 
to reduce her contribution, ceteris paribus), and we include individual and period fixed 
effects.  We estimate the regression for each treatment both using OLS and Tobit.
21  
Results are shown in Table 7. 
The regression results suggest that punishment of lowest contributors tended to be 
followed by increases in their contributions (all coefficients on l*Rji are positive and 
significant) while punishment of highest contributors led to reductions in their 
contributions (significant negative coefficients on h*Rji in the regressions for the P and 




rd highest contributors seems to have also led to those individuals 
increasing their contributions in the P treatment, but shows no significant effect in the 
other three treatments.    
 
Result 8.  A group’s lower (highest) contributors tend to increase (reduce) their 




                                                 
19 If the group has only three contribution levels in the period, we code the highest and lowest contributions 
as h and l and we code the middle contribution as 2
nd if it is above or equal to the average and as 3
rd if 
below the average.  If there are only two contribution levels, we code them as h and l.  If there is only one 
contribution level, we code it as h if it is 10, l if 0, and otherwise we drop the observations for that group 
and period. 
20 The uninteracted dummy for 2
nd highest contributor is the omitted category.   
21 The Tobit regressions are estimated using the cnreg command in Stata, treating the dependent variable—  
Ci,t+1  - Ci,t—as possibly left-censored if Ct+1 = 0 and as possibly right-censored if Ct+1 = 10. 
22 These are further confirmations of the negative and hence efficiency-reducing effect of punishment of the 
highest contributor that led Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) to call it perverse punishment.  Note that because Rji 
stands for net punishment (which can take a negative value if the subject received a net reward), the 
negative impact of punishment on highest contributors’ contributions and the positive impact on lowest 
contributors’ contributions incorporates instances in the RP and CIRP treatments in which rewarded high 
contributors increased their contributions.   25
Treatment  P RP  CIP  CIRP 
Reg. type  OLS  Tobit  OLS  Tobit  OLS  Tobit  OLS  Tobit 
H  -.962**  
(.374) 
-.108   
(.806) 
-1.35***   
(.443) 
2.522   
(2.164) 
-.667**   
(.302) 




-.814   
(.542) 
3
rd  2.302***   
(.478) 
2.561**   
(1.018) 
2.199***   
(.640) 
1.260   
(2.997) 
1.387***   
(.409) 
1.855*   
(.947) 
.547*   
(.324) 
.345   
(.651) 
L  3.254***   
(.416) 
2.838***   
(.918) 
2.096***   
(.509) 
2.263   
(2.527) 
1.541***   
(.356) 
.994    
(.849) 
1.329***   
(.294) 
1.686***   
(.606) 
h*Rji  -.184**    
(.093) 
-.379*    
(.219) 
.028   
(.030) 
.243   
(.232) 
-.007   
(.043) 
-.152     
(.176) 
-.059***   
(.016) 
-.294***   
(.060) 
2
nd*Rji  .360**   
(.152) 
.549*   
(.318) 
-.031   
(.108) 
.133   
(.474) 
-.056   
(.130) 
.022   
(.320) 
-.035   
(.068) 
.011   
(.138) 
3
rd*Rji  .301***   
(.110) 
.466*   
(.247) 
-.008   
(.127) 
.461   
(.612) 
.076   
(.103) 
-.093   
(.247) 
-.011   
(.056) 
-.008     
(.114) 
l*Rji  .404***   
(.053) 
.604***   
(.136) 
.283***   
(.037) 
.574**   
(.244) 
.191***   
(.022) 
.236***   
(.055) 
.186***   
(.023) 
.239***   
(.051) 
# Obs.  1212 1212 1216 1216 1216 1216  1216  1216 
F stat.  7.54  6.46  4.91   6.12   
χ
2   614.92  369.31  488.03    453.03 
Adj. R




 0.1652  0.1970  0.1722    0.1562 
Table 7.  Determinants of change in contribution.  All regressions include individual 
and period fixed effects, not shown.  Dependent variable: Ci,t+1  - Ci,t.  ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
How common are perverse punishments and rewards? 
  A major conjecture motivating our experiment was that if earnings taken from 
punished group members had to be distributed to other members, this might discourage 
perverse punishment while encouraging pro-social punishment of low contributors, thus 
increasing efficiency.  What is the incidence of perverse punishment in the RP and CIRP 
treatments and how does it compare to that in the P and CIP treatments? 
Table 8 lists the percentage of punishment events in which a group’s highest 
contributor was punished, the percentage of punishment dollars given to a group’s   26
highest contributor, the percentage of punishment events in which a contributor of more 
than the group average was punished, and the percentage of punishment dollars given to 
contributors of more than the group average.
23  The left and right halves of the table 
differ in two respects.  First, entries in the left half of the table differ from those in the 
right half for the RP and CIRP treatments because on the left we count punishment 
without subtracting off countervailing rewards to the same individual, while on the right 
we net out the rewards, thus causing any case in which the targeted individual received 
more reward than punishment not to appear as a punishment event.  Second, entries on 
the left treat each time a subject j was punished by some subject i as a separate event, 
while entries on the right treat receipt of punishment by j in a given period as one event 
regardless of whether the punishment came from one other subject only, or from two or 
three other subjects.  The counts on the left thus better reflect acts of punishing as seen  
 
Method:  “Gross,” with i,j interaction as event 
(Punisher’s view) 








P RP  CIP  CIRP 
 
1) events, to 
highest  
Contributor 
17.2 14.7  9.2  15.1 22.7 11.8 12.3 14.2 
2) dollars, to 
highest  
contributor  
17.2 7.9  7.1 14.3  17.2 3.5  7.1  9.9 
3) events, to > 
average 
contributors 
24.6 16.3 20.2 18.1 32.0 13.6 23.8 16.0 
4) dollars, to > 
average 
contributors 
24.2 9.2 11.0  15.8  24.2 4.8 11.0  10.9 
Table 8.  Frequency of “perverse” punishment, by treatment and measure.  
                                                 
23 For purposes of the table, we drop from the counts of both the total instances of punishment and the 
instances of perverse punishment cases in which all group members contributed 10.  Such cases accounted 
for less than 1% of punishment events in the P treatment, but for 13 to 18% of punishment events in the 
remaining three treatments (where periods with uniformly full contributions were more common).  We 
include the less common punishments in the event of the other occasional tie, that in which all subjects 
contributed 0, treating it as equivalent to punishing a lowest contributor, and hence as never perverse.   27
from the punishers’ points of view, whereas the counts on the right reflect instances of 
being punished as seen from the recipients’ standpoints.
24   
  Judged in terms of punisher behavior (the left side of the table), our conjecture 
that requiring punished dollars to be given to other group members would reduce the 
proportion of punishment targeted perversely at high contributors receives only limited 
support.  In particular, for the pair of treatments without monitoring cost—the treatments 
resembling Fehr and Gächter (2000) and its replications—the share of punishment that is 
perversely targeted is smaller with redistribution (i.e., in RP) than without (in P), by all 
measures.  Our conjecture is thus supported in this more familiar setting.  But for the pair 
of treatments with monitoring cost,  more perverse punishment is given when punishment 
is redistributive (in CIRP) than when it is not (in CIP), by all but one measure.   
  On the other hand, the right side of Table 8, which views the matter from the 
operationally more relevant standpoint of the recipient of punishment, shows that making 
punishment redistributive was in fact successful at generating better incentives to 
contribute.  The proportion of punishment events aimed at highest contributors falls from 
17.2% in the P treatment to 3.5% in the RP and 9.9% in the CIRP treatment.  The 
proportions of punishment events and dollars going to above-average contributors are 
lower in RP than in P and lower in CIRP than in CIP, although the dollar difference is 
negligible for the latter comparison.  Only the dollars to highest contributor measure fails 
to support the idea that making punishment redistributive reduces perverse punishment, 
and only (again) in the CIRP versus CIP comparison.   
  Even this partial failure of making punishment redistributive to reduce the relative 
shares of perverse punishment in the treatments with costly information can be looked at 
in a very different light, however.  That is, the proportions of punishment which are 
perverse are strikingly low in both costly information treatments, as compared to the P 
treatment and the other experimental treatments cited earlier.  It seems that making 
information costly has itself reduced punishment of high contributors because (a) it is low 
                                                 
24 Recall that the information conditions were such that the recipient learned only the net outcome of 
punishment or reward, not the combination of acts by his/her three fellow group members which brought it 
about.  Thus, for instance, a high contributor who was punished by one group member but rewarded a 
greater amount by others received no indication that a perverse punishment event had occurred, making the 
right-hand accounting the more appropriate one for gauging the incentive implications of punishment for 
contribution decisions.   28
contributors who tend to punish high ones, but (b) low contributors did less monitoring in 
treatments with costly information.  Evidence for (b) is seen in Table 6.  For (a), consider 
Table 9, which shows what proportion of punishment given to highest contributors came 
from lowest and 2
nd-to-lowest ones.  In the P treatment, with neither redistributive 
punishment nor costly monitoring, almost two-thirds of punishment given to highest 
contributors comes from lowest ones, with 85% of such perverse punishment coming 
from either lowest or 2
nd-to-lowest contributors. 
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RP  57 32  56.14%  8  14.04% 
70 
CI  33 26  78.78%  5  15.15% 
95 
CIRP  60 43  71.66%  6  10.00% 
81 




Result 9a. Making punishment redistributive has no clear effect on the targeting of 
punishment at high contributors by individual punishers, but high contributors receive 
significantly less net punishment in redistributive treatments, thus reducing their 
disincentive to contribute more. 
 
Result 9b.  Making contribution information costly reduces perverse punishment by 
reducing the representation of low contributors among those punishing.   
 
                                                 
25 In this exercise, a subject is called “2
nd-to-lowest contributor” if her contribution was third of four 
different contribution levels or if it was the middle one of three different contribution levels.   29
Was it harder to free ride in the new designs? 
  Was free riding thwarted more successfully in the new designs.  If by “free 
riding” we mean contributing little or nothing, then the contribution differences 
summarized earlier and in Figures 1a and 1b suffice to answer in the affirmative.  A more 
rigorous definition of free riding, however, is that an individual j who contributes less 
than another individual i successfully free rides only when j ends up earning more than i 
taking into account punishments, rewards, and their costs (including costs of monitoring).  
We counted all cases in our four treatments in which an individual j contributed less than 
another individual i in the same group and period, and we calculated the proportion of 
those cases in which j ended up earning more than i in that period.  The results are 
striking.  Table 10 shows that whereas only a little more than 20% of potential free riding 
was eliminated by punishment in the P treatment, about half of potential free riding was 
eliminatd by punishment, or by punishment and rewards, in the RP, CIP, and CIRP 
treatments.   
Table 10.  Proportion of potential free-riding events that succeeded, by treatment. 
 
 
Result 10.  Free-riding is more effectively thwarted by punishment in the treatments 
with costly monitoring and/or redistributive punishment. 
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
We introduced two new design elements into prototypical public goods or VCM-
with-punishment experiments.  The first element is a requirement that any money 
subtracted from a group member’s earnings be awarded to some other group member or 
members.  The second makes accessing information about what each individual assigned 
to the group account a costly choice.  Both innovations can be motivated by a concern 
Treatment  Of events in which Cj < Ci , in what proportion was yj > yi? 
P  806/1016 = 0.79 
RP  271/566 = 0.48 
CI  427/803 = 0.53 
CIRP  410/855 = 0.48   30
with the targeting of punishment.  The introduction of costly monitoring is further 
motivated by the fact that it is a relevant element of many real-world collective action 
problems, but thus far not accounted for in public goods experiments. 
We found that both redistributive punishment and costly monitoring reduced the 
incidence of misdirected or perverse (net) punishment and thus increased contributions to 
the public good.  Redistributive punishment also increased earnings, with or without 
costly monitoring, although earnings are significantly higher after differences in resource 
costs are netted out only in our redistributive punishment treatment with free information, 
RP.  Making punishment redistributive appears to have reduced the impulse to punish 
perversely in the treatments without monitoring cost, and it reduced the net outcome of 
perverse punishment in both treatments because what perverse punishing did occur was 
often out-weighed by the efficiency-enhancing pattern of rewards.  Making monitoring 
costly appears to have reduced perverse punishment because it disproportionately 
removed low contributors from the set of potential punishers, and because it is mainly 
low contributors who punish perversely. 
In the real world, punishment of free riders and rewarding of cooperators are often 
observed in tandem, including in cases where punishment and rewards take the forms of 
social disapproval and approval.  Fines levied on norm violators can be used to finance 
goods that cooperators value, although it’s difficult to think of cases in which pecuniary 
or material punishment is both decentralized (that is, left to individuals) and 
redistributive.  Centralized redistribution from low to high contributors is automatically 
effected by the Falkinger mechanism studied by Falkinger, Fehr, Gächter, and Winter-
Ebmer (2000), and that pattern is emulated in the recent experiment with cost-free 
decentralized redistribution by Sausgruber and Tyran (2007). 
Studying monitoring in both lab and field is an important area for future research.  
Our exploratory initial treatments made punishing itself free once information was paid 
for, but it seems more realistic to make both choices costly.  More complex information 
structures, for instance ones in which the information obtained can be imperfect or in 
which the accuracy of that information increases with additional expenditure, are also 
worth investigating.   31
At a general level, our study provides more evidence, consistent with Ostrom, 
Gardner and Walker (1992), Fehr and  Gächter (2000), Page, Putterman and Unel (2005), 
Gürerk, Ő., B. Irlenbusch and B. Rockenbach (2006) and others, that many individuals’ 
choices display positive and negative reciprocity (conditionally cooperating, and 
incurring cost to punish free riders), and that the existence of such individuals can 
ameliorate free rider problems by rendering it best for selfish individuals to cooperate and 
by supporting, in this way, conditional cooperators’ inclinations to contribute.  However, 
we also find a subset of “contrary” individuals who perversely punish cooperators, 
reducing the incentives of the latter to voluntarily contribute to a public good.  Our 
experiment shows that reducing the presence of such individuals in the pool of potential 
punishers by making monitoring costly, and reducing their net effect on those targeted by 
making punishing redistributive, are both effective ways of reducing their negative 
impact.   32
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Figure 1.  Average contribution by period.  Possible contributions range from 0 to 10.  
The upper figure compares the P and RP treatments, the lower one the CIP and CIRP 
treatments. 





Figure 2.  Average earnings by period.  Possible earnings range from the Nash 
equilibrium level of 10 (or less due to punishment and monitoring costs) to social 
optimum earnings of 16.  The upper figure compares the P and RP treatments, the lower 
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